Lee's Decisions at Gettysburg offers a groundbreaking reevaluation of one of the most debated controversies of the American Civil War-the feasibility of General James Longstreet's proposal to maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia south after the first day of fighting.

Edward B. McCaul, a retired Army officer and military historian, draws on overlooked logistical, geographical, and intelligence factors to argue that Lee's army was no longer capable of extensive movement after July 1, 1863. Integrating military history with strategic analysis, the book examines issues such as forage and water requirements, cavalry dispositions, and the location of Federal units beyond the battlefield-forces that could have rapidly assembled to oppose any Confederate shift.

McCaul challenges long-held assumptions by demonstrating how constraints in supply, terrain, and time shaped Lee's decisions and limited his options. Featuring detailed tables, maps, and newly considered Federal troop dispositions, this study illuminates the audacity and risk inherent in Lee's campaign planning. Intended for Civil War scholars, professional military officers, and serious enthusiasts, this book provides fresh insight into why a seemingly sound plan was not feasible in practice, reframing our understanding of Confederate strategy at Gettysburg.