Well-Being and Theism is divided into two distinctive parts. The first part argues that desire-fulfillment welfare theories fail to capture the 'good' part of 'good for', and that objective list welfare theories fail to capture the 'for' part of 'good for'. Then, with the aim of capturing both of these parts of 'good for', a hybrid theory-one which places both a value constraint and a desire constraint on well-being-is advanced. Lauinger then defends this proposition, which he calls the desire-perfectionism theory, against possible objections.

In the second part, Lauinger explores the question of what metaphysics best supports the account of well-being defended in the first part. It is argued that there are two general metaphysical routes that might convincingly be taken here, and that each one leads us toward theism.

William A. Lauinger is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Chestnut Hill College, PA, USA.