{"product_id":"9781461369370","title":"The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The “Costs” of Managed Competition","description":"\u003ch1\u003eThe Telecommunications Act of 1996: The “Costs” of Managed Competition\u003c\/h1\u003e \u003ch2\u003eLehman, Dale E.; Weisman, Dennis\u003c\/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Telecommunications Act of 1996 envisioned a competitive  free-for-all in the U.S. telecommunications industry with removal of  barriers to entry in local telecommunications markets and the lifting  of the artificial restrictions that kept the Regional Bell Operating  Companies (RBOCs) out of the interLATA long-distance market. After  close to 5 years, only one RBOC has been granted permission  (controversially) to enter the interLATA market, and local competition  has yet to provide most consumers with meaningful choices. In  addition, the wave of mergers across the industry has raised the  specter of putting the former Bell System back together again.  Policymakers now openly question whether the Act can deliver what it  promised. \u003cbr\u003e  Three principal themes are developed in this book. First, there has  been a coordination failure between Congress and the FCC in  translating the principles embodied in the Act into practice. The  authors provide evidence for this by analyzing stock market reactions  to legislative and regulatory actions. This coordination failure was  largely predictable, given the ambiguity in the Act, as well as  conflicting jurisdictions between the FCC and the states. \u003cbr\u003e  Second, the Act calls for wholesale prices to be `based on cost.'  Regulators adopted a costing standard (TELRIC) that provides a means  to subsidize competitive entry in local telephone service markets. The  ready adoption of the TELRIC standard by regulators is shown to be  tied to the third theme: price cap regulation provides regulators with  `insurance' against the adverse effects of competition in local  telephone markets. Statistical analysis reveals that regulators in  price cap states set uniformly lower unbundled network element prices  (lower barriers to entry) in comparison with regulators in  rate-of-return and earnings sharing states. The result is a triumph of  regulatory processes over market processes - the antithesis of  the purpose of the Act.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003ch3\u003eDetails\u003c\/h3\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublished by: Springer\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublication Date: 2012-11-02\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFormat: Paperback\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e ISBN-10: 9781461369370\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eISBN-13: 9781461369370\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDOI: 10.1007\/978-1-4615-4315-2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimensions: 235cm x155cm\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePages: 128\u003c\/p\u003e ","brand":"Springer","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":44359140376716,"sku":"9781461369370","price":99.0,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0710\/9545\/1788\/files\/9781461369370.jpg?v=1755102273","url":"https:\/\/fh90cf-fv.myshopify.com\/products\/9781461369370","provider":"Late Knight Books and Services, LLC","version":"1.0","type":"link"}