{"product_id":"9780792359746","title":"Philosophical Studies Series","description":"\u003ch1\u003ePhilosophical Studies Series\u003c\/h1\u003e \u003ch2\u003ePaul, M.\u003c\/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is  referential uptake, \u003cem\u003eviz.\u003c\/em\u003e, the question of what counts as  properly `understanding' a referring act in communication. In this  inquiry, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on  re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth  Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to  account for success in referential communication. A novel account is  developed, resembling Evans' account in combining an external success  condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater  emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication.  Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in  accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the  understanding of referring acts, and Donnellan's  referential\/attributive distinction. \u003cbr\u003e  \u003cem\u003eReadership:\u003c\/em\u003e Philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003ch3\u003eDetails\u003c\/h3\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublished by: Springer\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublication Date: 1999-09-30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFormat: Hardcover\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eISBN-13: 9780792359746\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDOI: 10.1007\/978-94-017-3181-2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimensions: 235cm x155cm\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePages: 172\u003c\/p\u003e ","brand":"Springer Netherlands","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":44481647345804,"sku":"9780792359746","price":98.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0710\/9545\/1788\/files\/9780792359746.jpg?v=1770782670","url":"https:\/\/fh90cf-fv.myshopify.com\/products\/9780792359746","provider":"Late Knight Books and Services, LLC","version":"1.0","type":"link"}